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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT ELLIS COX, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
CaseNo.20040894-SC 
This Court has asked Petitioner Robert Cox and the state to address whether an 
appellate court has the authority to remand a case for nunc-pro-tunc resentencing when it 
lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from the convictions. (See Order, dated December 22, 
2004.) Cox maintains it does. 
As set forth in the Brief of Petitioner, if an existing record supports that defense 
counsel was ineffective in perfecting an appeal, an appellate court has the authority to 
remand the case to the original sentencing court and to order, advise, direct, or instruct 
resentencing, even where the appellate court otherwise lacks jurisdiction over an appeal 
from the convictions. (Brief of Petitioner, dated March 25, 2005.) Cox asked the Court 
of Appeals to remand for resentencing here. It refused. See State v. Cox, 2004 UT App 
277, 2004 Utah App. LEXIS 305. He is now asking this Court for a remedy. 
In its brief, the state acknowledges that this Court has inherent supervisory powers 
and authority over the judiciary in this State. (See Brief of Respondent ("State's Brief), 
dated July 1, 2005, at 17.) Likewise, while this Court may dismiss an appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction over the convictions, it also may advise or explain (see id. at 11) further 
proceedings for the parties and trial court to follow. (Id.) 
The state agrees that resentencing in certain circumstances is an appropriate 
remedy. (Id. at 35 (asserting that the state will stipulate to resentencing "when the record 
facts indisputably demonstrate that the defendant was denied his right to appeal").) 
However, it maintains that if an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over convictions, it 
must dismiss; it may not remand the case to the original court for resentencing even 
where the existing record supports it. (See State's Brief, Argument.) That is untenable. 
An appellate court is charged with carefully protecting the right to appeal. State v. 
Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703, 704 (Utah 1985). At this juncture, Cox has been denied an appeal 
through no fault of his own. (Brief of Petitioner, Argument B.) He is seeking a remedy in 
resentencing. (Id., Argument A.2.) While an appellate court may lack jurisdiction over 
an appeal from the convictions, it also may direct resentencing in the original case so that 
a defendant may take a timely appeal from the new sentence and judgment. See State v. 
Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37-38 (Utah 1981). That is what Cox requests here. 
THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE RESENTENCING AS A REMEDY 
WHEN COUNSEL IS INEFFECTIVE IN PERFECTING AN APPEAL; IT 
MAINTAINS ONLY THAT AN APPELLATE COURT MAY NOT ORDER 
THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING COURT TO PROVIDE SUCH A 
REMEDY. YET, UTAH LAW PERMITS REMAND AND 
RESENTENCING. 
2 
A. THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT COUNSEL IN THIS CASE WAS 
INEFFECTIVE IN PERFECTING AN APPEAL FROM THE CONVICTIONS. 
THUS. COX IS ENTITLED TO REMAND TO THE ORIGINAL SENTENCING 
COURT. 
Before this Court or the Court of Appeals may exercise statutory appellate 
jurisdiction over a conviction, a timely notice of appeal must be filed. See Utah R. App. 
P. 3 & 4 (2005); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3), 78-2a-3(2) (2002). 
In this case, the record supports that defense counsel provided ineffective assis-
tance in perfecting an appeal from the convictions. (Brief of Petitioner, Argument B.) It 
shows that after trial and before sentencing, counsel filed a post-trial motion for a new 
trial. (See R. 182-86,203-06.) The motion was premature and untimely under Utah R. 
Crim. P. 24(c) (2005) (motion must be made within ten days after sentencing). It did not 
toll the effect of the sentence and judgment for purposes of the appeal. See State v. 
Putnik, 2002 UT 122, T|5, 63 P.3d 91. 
Nevertheless, at sentencing in December 2003, counsel for Cox claimed in open 
court that the motion stayed the time for filing a notice of appeal. (R. 291:4-5; see also 
302: 15-17.) Counsel's representations were incorrect. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (stating 
that a timely post-trial motion will toll the time for an appeal); Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c) 
(specifying that a new trial motion must be filed after sentencing). They misled Cox. 
Also, counsel acknowledged an appeal for Cox in the case. (R. 291:4-5.) 
However, counsel did not file a timely notice. Instead, almost three months after 
sentencing, on March 2, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on the post-trial motion. (R. 
302.) During the hearing, trial counsel assisted Cox in signing a notice of appeal, and 
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counsel advised Cox and the trial court that he would file the notice after the trial court 
entered the order on the post-trial motion. (R. 302:15-17.) At that point in the 
proceedings, the notice would have been too late. See Utah R. App. P. 3 & 4. Cox again 
was misled by counsel's misstatements since the time for appeal had elapsed. 
On March 11, 2004, the trial court entered an order denying the post-trial motion. 
(R. 263-65.) Cox then filed his notice of appeal on April 8, 2004. (R. 266.) The notice 
was filed within 30 days of the order on the post-trial motion. It did not give the Court of 
Appeals jurisdiction over the convictions. 
On August 19, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. Cox, 
2004 UT App 277. It also rejected Cox's request to remand the case to the original sen-
tencing court for the limited purpose of resentencing. According to the Court of Appeals, 
Cox must pursue resentencing in habeas proceedings and he must demonstrate what the 
record here already established: "that he lost his right to appeal because of counsel's mis-
representations or ineffective assistance.11 Id (relying on Utah R. Civ. P. 65C). The 
Court of Appeals maintained it could not remand for resentencing because it lacked 
jurisdiction over an appeal from the convictions. Cox, 2004 UT App 277. It did not see 
the duplicity in its ruling: while it purportedly lacked jurisdiction to order anything 
further, it simultaneously ordered Cox to pursue his remedy in habeas. Id 
The state does not dispute that trial counsel was ineffective in perfecting a timely 
appeal from the convictions in Cox's case. (See State's Brief.) That point is uncontested. 
Notwithstanding, the state asserts that even under the circumstances here, an 
4 
appellate court may not remand to the original sentencing court for resentencing. (See 
e.g. State's Brief at 5.) According to the state, if an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over 
a conviction, it must dismiss the appeal without more. (Id.) In connection with that posi-
tion, the state has cited to cases that have no relevance to the resentencing issue here, and 
it has rejected or disregarded orders from this Court supporting remand to the original 
criminal case where the record supports ineffective assistance of counsel. The state also 
seems to claim that the rules of appellate procedure prohibit remand for resentencing. 
(See State's Brief at 6-10,14-15, 18-25.) Cox has addressed each matter below. 
1. The State Has Cited to Cases That Do Not Concern Resentencing. 
The state maintains that if an appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal from 
the convictions, it must dismiss; it may not remand the case to the original sentencing 
court for resentencing. In support of its position, the state has cited to civil cases. It also 
has cited to State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122; State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, 57 P.3d 1065; 
and State v. Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264 (Utah 1997). (State's Brief at 7, 8-10, 14-15.) Those 
cases support that an appellate court may not exercise statutory appellate jurisdiction over 
the convictions in a case where the appeal was not properly perfected. Cox does not 
dispute that proposition. He recognizes that at this stage in his case, the Court of Appeals 
lacks jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3(2) over an appeal from the convictions; thus, he 
did not ask the court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under that provision. Rather, he 
asked the Court of Appeals to order a process pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(l) for a 
remedy in the original sentencing court. He asked the court to remand for resentencing. 
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The Court of Appeals had statutory authority to grant Cox's request. (See Brief of 
Petitioner at 18-21 (discussing an appellate court's authority to dismiss an appeal for lack 
of jurisdiction and to remand for further proceedings in the original court).) 
Specifically, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l), the Court of Appeals has 
the authority to order any process necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. See also Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(2) (providing this Court with the same statutory authority). That power 
and authority is not limited to cases where a proper appeal has been perfected. See 
Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 681 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Indeed, the authority to 
order any "process" in aid of jurisdiction is separate from an appellate court's statutory 
jurisdiction over an appeal. Id. (stating that the authority to order any process in aid of 
jurisdiction does not depend on appellate jurisdiction over the matter); see also Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(2) (concerning authority to issue any process in aid of jurisdiction) 
and -2(3) (concerning statutory appellate jurisdiction); 78-2a-3(l) and (2). Thus, where 
Cox requested relief in the Court of Appeals in aid of jurisdiction, and where the record 
supported that Cox received ineffective assistance of counsel in perfecting an original 
appeal in his case, the Court of Appeals had the authority to direct or remand the case to 
the original sentencing court for resentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l). 
The cases cited by the state in this matter are not relevant to that issue. Putnik, 
2002 UT 122, Bowers, 2002 UT 100, and Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, do not address the issue 
of remand for resentencing when the record supports ineffective assistance of counsel in 
perfecting an appeal. There is no indication in those cases that the defendant requested or 
6 
briefed the issue of resentencing, and there is no indication that the Court contemplated 
the issue under Utah law. See Putmk, 2002 UT 122; Bowers, 2002 UT 100; Jiminez, 938 
P.2d 264. Since Putnik, Bowers, and Jiminez do not discuss remand for resentencing, 
they are not controlling authority for the issue here. See Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 1989) (ruling that where case law fails to provide 
analysis for a proposition, it has little persuasive effect and is not dispositive of Ihe issue). 
2. Utah Cases Support Remand Where Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Is 
Established on the Existing Record. 
Next, the state maintains that no precedent from this Court supports "defendant's 
contention that an appellate court may, in an untimely appeal, remand to the district court 
with instructions to resentence the defendant." (State's Brief at 16.) Yet, orders from this 
Court support remand. Cox provided copies of the orders as a courtesy. See Slate v. 
Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC (Addendum D to the Brief of Petitioner); State v. 
Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC (Addendum E to the Brief of Petitioner); State v. 
Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC (Addendum F to the Brief of Petitioner). He also 
presented the orders to the Court of Appeals. (See State's Brief, Addendum C at 2, ml.) 
In State v. Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC, State v. Munford, Case No. 20010413-
SC, and State v. Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC, this Court specifically granted Salt 
Lake Legal Defender Association's request to remand for resentencing. The state was 
involved in those proceedings. See Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, Case No. 
20010413-SC; Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC. 
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In each of those cases, the defendant desired to appeal from the convictions; this 
Court lacked jurisdiction over an appeal; this Court remanded for resentencing. See 
Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC; Hassan, Case No. 
20020885-SC. In Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC, this Court ordered that counsel must 
be appointed to protect the defendant's right to appeal (Addendum E to Brief of 
Petitioner). In Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC, this Court recognized that defendant was 
denied his right to appeal by an attorney "who has since been suspended from the practice 
of law." (Addendum D to Brief of Petitioner.) In Hassan, Case No. 20020885, this Court 
relied on its statutory authority under § 78-2-2(2) to issue "any process necessary" in aid 
of jurisdiction and to carry its orders into effect. (Addendum F to Brief of Petitioner.) 
The orders in Clark, Munford, and Hassan constitute in-court precedent; the 
principles set forth therein apply to this case. 
The record here supports that while Cox intended to exercise his constitutional 
right to appeal, trial counsel failed to properly perfect that appeal. (Brief of Appellant at 
31-37.) Thus, the Court of Appeals lacked statutory appellate jurisdiction over the 
convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2). However, the Court of Appeals had the 
power and authority to remand at this juncture for resentencing (see Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(l)), just as this Court did in Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC, Munford, Case No. 
20010413-SC, and Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC. The orders in those cases have force 
and effect; they are relevant to the issue here. They support remand for resentencing. 
Cox is entitled to remand to the original sentencing court for additional reasons 
8 
that the state has not addressed in its brief. (See State's Brief.) First, the trial court here 
failed to advise Cox at sentencing of his right to appeal. {See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(c); (R. 
291; 203-06). That supports remand for new sentencing proceedings. See U.S. v. Butler, 
938 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1991) (remanding for resentencing where the trial court failed to 
properly advise defendant of his right to appeal); (Brief of Petitioner at 35). 
Second, Cox has established ineffective assistance of counsel on the existing re-
cord. (Brief of Petitioner at 31-35.) Under Utah law, if the record supports ineffective 
assistance, the appellate court will remand the case to that point in the original criminal 
proceedings where the ineffective assistance occurred. See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 
32, p 7 , 984 P.2d 376 (ruling that counsel's deficient performance at trial entitled 
defendant to a new trial); State v. Holland, 921 P.2d 430 (Utah 1996) (finding ineffective 
assistance and remanding for new proceedings); State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 
1029-30 (Utah 1991) (finding ineffective assistance where counsel failed to object to 
prosecutorial misconduct at trial, and remanding for a new trial); State v. Templin, 805 
P.2d 182, 187-89 (Utah 1990) (remanding for a new trial where counsel failed to 
investigate witnesses who were known to him before trial). 
Since ineffective assistance is established on an existing record here, the case 
should be remanded for new proceedings. Such an order of remand would not result in 
preferential treatment to Cox, but would be consistent with other cases, where ineffective 
assistance of counsel occurred. See e.g. Maestas, 1999 UT 32 at TJ37; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187-89; (Brief of Petitioner at 34-35). 
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In the context of this case, where the post-trial motion was untimely, it did not toll 
the effect of the judgment for purposes of the appeal (see Utah R. App. P. 4; Utah R. 
Crim. P. 24). The Court of Appeals lacked statutory appellate jurisdiction over the 
judgment of convictions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (identifying appellate 
jurisdiction). However, that did not preclude the Court of Appeals from saying more 
about the matter. Specifically, where a notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of an 
order on the post-trial motion, the court could remand to those proceedings. Pursuant to 
the Court of Appeals1 statutory authority to order any process in aid of its jurisdiction 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(l)), and based on the record of ineffective assistance in the 
proceedings here, the Court of Appeals should have ordered a limited remedy: remand to 
that point in the proceedings where the error occurred. (Brief of Petitioner at 34-35.) 
3. Remand Is Not Prohibited by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
Finally, the state seems to claim that if an appellate court remands for resen-
tencing, it somehow will be invoking or exercising its statutory appellate jurisdiction over 
the convictions, or enlarging the time for appeal under the appellate rules, or suspending 
or circumventing those rules. (See State's Brief at 6-7, 18-21.) 
Yet, that is not the case. Remand does not require an appellate court to enlarge the 
time for an appeal under the rules. See Black's Law Dictionary, 571 (8th ed. 2004) 
(defining an enlargement of time to mean an "extension of the time allowed to perform an 
action"); Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37-38 (stating the time for appeal cannot be enlarged; and 
articulating a motion procedure in the sentencing court for resentencing). 
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It does not require an appellate court to suspend, circumvent or transubstantiate 
the appellate rules. See Black's Law Dictionary, 260, 1487 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "cir-
cumvention" to mean the act of bypassing or avoiding; and defining "suspend" to mean to 
interrupt, postpone, or defer); Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999, 1000 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) (explaining that certain motions will suspend the effect of an existing 
judgment); Webster's New World College Dictionary, 1522 (4th ed. 1999) (defining 
"transubstantiate" to mean to transform). 
Remand will return this case to that point in the proceedings in the original trial 
court where error occurred. It will serve to purge the proceedings of the taint caused by 
the error. Just as remand for a new trial does not serve to enlarge, suspend or circumvent 
the appellate rules, remand for resentencing does not have any such effect on the rules. 
Remand is not prohibited by the rules of appellate procedure. 
B. RESENTENCING IS A REMEDY THAT IS AVAILABLE IF THE RECORD 
SUPPORTS THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN PERFECTING AN 
APPEAL. 
1. The Court of Appeals Had Authority to Order Resentencing. 
In this case, the Court of Appeals refused to direct or order resentencing in the ori-
ginal sentencing court even though the record supported ineffective assistance of counsel. 
See Cox, 2004 UT App 277. It seemed to believe that only a habeas court could order 
resentencing. Id. It ruled that Cox must seek his remedy in habeas in the district court, 
and he must establish what the existing record already supported here: "that he lost his 
right to appeal because of counsel's misrepresentations or ineffective assistance." Id. 
11 
Yet an appellate court may order the remedy of resentencing. Resentencing allows 
a defendant to be sentenced "upon the previous finding of guilt so as to afford him fan 
opportunity of prosecuting and perfecting an appeal, since the time for taking such appeal 
would date from the rendition of the new judgment.,,f Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (cite 
omitted). 
Cox maintains that if the existing record supports ineffective assistance of counsel 
in perfecting the appeal, an appellate court may order or direct resentencing in the 
original trial court (see Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC; 
Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC), or it may advise a motion practice for the procedure in 
that court. 
In State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981), this Court advised trial courts in 
how to proceed with resentencing in the original criminal case. It looked to the common-
law writ of coram nobis and Rule 65B(i) to adopt a motion practice in the sentencing 
court. See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(i) (1977)). It did not 
require the defendant to pursue resentencing in habeas proceedings. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(f) (1977) (concerning habeas corpus proceedings); (Brief of Petitioner at 14-16). 
Rule 65B as it exists today specifically accommodates a "motion" in the original 
sentencing court for resentencing. It allows a party to file a petition for relief; it states, 
"there shall be no special form of writ." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a) (2005). Thus, a petition 
under Rule 65B may be in the form of a motion in the original sentencing court. (See 
Brief of Petitioner at 16, n.3.) 
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Also, Rule 65B applies where "no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy is 
available." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). If a defendant were denied an appeal through no 
fault of his own, he has no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy for the appeal. Thus, 
an appellate court may order resentencing in the original sentencing court so that defen-
dant may file a motion under Rule 65B for the remedy. (Brief of Petitioner at 23-26.) 
In the alternative, Rule 60(b) may be an appropriate avenue for resentencing in the 
original sentencing court. Pursuant to that rule, a party may be relieved from a final judg-
ment for any reason justifying relief and upon such terms as are just where there has been 
inadvertence, excusable neglect, or the like. Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). The rule accommo-
dates relief from judgment where defense counsel was ineffective, and it accommodates 
reimposition of the original sentence to ensure justice. (See Brief of Petitioner at 29-31.) 
Under the proper circumstances, an appellate court may direct a defendant to file a 
motion under Rule 60(b) in the original sentencing court for resentencing. (Id.) 
In this case, Cox has raised several provisions that would accommodate a proce-
dure for resentencing in the original court. (See Brief of Petitioner, Argument A.2.) Cox 
relied on those same provisions when he asked the Court of Appeals to order resen-
tencing. (See "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Temporarily Remand this Case to 
the Trial Court for Resentencing," attached as Addendum C to the State's Brief, and 
citing Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC (remanding for direct resentencing); Munford, Case 
No. 20010413-SC (same); Hassan, Case No. 20020885-SC (same); Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(l) (authorizing the Court of Appeals to issue any process necessary in aid of its 
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jurisdiction); Barnard, 882 P.2d at 681 (recognizing that the court of appeals may 
exercise its statutory powers even where an appeal has not been perfected); Johnson, 635 
P.2d at 37-38 (advising that defendant should file a motion in the original sentencing 
court for resentencing to revive the right to appeal); Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) & 65B.) 
The Court of Appeals rejected Cox's request and refused to order resentencing in 
the sentencing court. Cox, 2004 UT App 277. That was error. (Brief of Petitioner, 
Argument A.) Cox now is seeking a remedy here. 
2. This Court May Order Resentencing in the Original Criminal Case and It May 
Implement Resentencing Procedures for the Trial Court to Follow. 
As set forth in the Brief of Petitioner, pursuant to the Utah Constitution and case 
law, this Court has inherent supervisory authority over the judiciary in this State. (See 
Brief of Petitioner, Argument A.2. (citing to cases supporting this Court's inherent super-
visory powers over the judiciary in this State, and Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3)); see also 
State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, [^37, 116 P.3d 305 (exercising inherent supervisory powers 
to promulgate a reasonable-doubt instruction for use in the trial courts of this State). 
That authority is unique to this Court. (See State's Brief at 16 (complaining that 
Cox did not rely on this Supreme Court's inherent supervisory powers in requesting relief 
in the Court of Appeals, and also recognizing that the Court of Appeals does not share in 
this Court's powers over the judiciary); also State's Brief at 32 (complaining that Cox did 
not rely on this Supreme Court's constitutional powers in requesting relief in the Court of 
Appeals); but see Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3 concerning the "Jurisdiction of [this] Supreme 
Court".) This Court may issue all processes and forms of proceedings necessary for the 
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exercise of its jurisdiction, in aid of its jurisdiction, to a complete determination of any 
cause, and to ensure a just process and result. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3; see also 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(2), 78-7-5(9) (2002); (Brief of Petitioner, Argument A.2.). 
While the Court of Appeals had sufficient authority under Utah statutory law and 
case law to order the relief that Cox requested here for resentencing (see e.g. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(l) (authorizing the Court of Appeals to issue any process necessary in aid 
of its jurisdiction); Johnson, 635 P.2d at 37-38 (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction and 
advising that defendant should file a motion in the original sentencing court for 
resentencing to revive the right to appeal)), this Court now may affirm a procedure 
pursuant to its inherent supervisory powers for the trial court to follow that will allow 
resentencing in the original case, where the existing record supports ineffective assistance 
of counsel in perfecting the appeal. (See Brief of Petitioner, Argument A.2.) 
Resentencing is a proper remedy. The state does not dispute that proposition. (See 
State's Brief at 35 (recognizing that a defendant may be entitled to resentencing when the 
record facts indisputably demonstrate that he was denied his right to appeal).) 
Cox should be resentenced in the sentencing court "so as to afford him 'an 
opportunity of prosecuting and perfecting an appeal, since the time for taking such appeal 
would date from the rendition of the new judgment.'" Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 (cite 
omitted). He respectfully requests that this Court order the remedy here for resentencing 
in the original criminal case. 
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C. PROCEEDINGS UNDER RULE 65C AND THE POST-CONVICTION 
REMEDIES ACT WOULD BE BURDENSOME TO COX. 
Where the Court of Appeals ordered Cox to comply with the provisions of Rule 
65C and the Post-Conviction Remedies Act (the "Act") for relief in this case, Cox, 2004 
UT App 277, that is unnecessary. Cox has already demonstrated ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the existing record. (Brief of Petitioner, Argument B.) He is entitled to a 
remedy. He should not be required to proceed with habeas for resentencing here. 
The state seems to agree. In its brief, the state asserts that defendant may file a 
"simple petition" for resentencing in the district court, where he will be represented by 
"able counsel." (State's Brief at 34-35.) The state claims that a simple petition is 
efficient and it will take less time to prepare than a brief for appeal. (Id.) 
As set forth in the Brief of Petitioner, Rule 65C and the Act do not accommodate a 
simple petition for resentencing or the right to "able counsel." (Brief of Petitioner, 
Argument C.) Indeed, according to Rule 65C, before a petitioner may be entitled to 
relief, he must file in forma pauperis papers, a petition for relief, and supporting 
memoranda. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b)-(d). The petition must set forth "all claims that 
the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 65C(c). Any "[additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence 
may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown." Jd. Also, 
successive petitions may not be permitted. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(d). 
In the context of this case, if Cox were required to proceed under Rule 65C for re-
sentencing, he must raise all claims in his petition that he intends to pursue later in 
16 
habeas. He will be required to present all substantive claims concerning ineffective assis-
tance of counsel, trial error, and the discovery of new evidence (see Utah Code Ann. § 
78-3 5 a-104), together with his procedural request for resentencing. He must including 
supporting attachments and a legal memorandum on the matter. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(d), 
(e). Where Cox must present all substantive claims together with his request for 
resentencing, his petition will be more involved than an actual brief on appeal. 
Thereafter, once Cox has filed his papers for habeas and resentencing under Rule 
65C, the habeas court will review them. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(g). If that court finds proce-
dural or filing defects, it may delay the proceedings or dismiss the claims. Id. If the 
habeas court does not dismiss any or all claims, Cox may request the appointment of pro 
bono counsel in the matter. See Cox, 2004 UT App 277; Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
109(1). The habeas court has the discretion to grant or deny that request; appellate coun-
sel here may be precluded from representing Cox in the habeas proceedings. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(l). 
The habeas court then will forward Cox's petition to the Attorney General's office 
for a response and further proceedings. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(h)-(m). 
In this case, the state claims it routinely stipulates to "the grant of a post-
conviction petition and resentencing" when the record facts support it. (State's Brief at 
35.) However, the state may decide to contest other claims raised in the petition, thereby 
resulting in further delay. Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(i) - (j). 
After the state has filed its papers in habeas, the district court may grant the 
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procedural remedy and order immediate resentencing in the original criminal case. See 
State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993). At that point in the proceedings, it is 
not clear what will become of the substantive claims that Cox has raised in his habeas 
petition. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65C; Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 through -110 (2002). 
They may be dismissed. If Cox's substantive claims then are not raised or resolved on the 
merits in the direct appeal, he may wish to proceed with them later in habeas. However, 
if they have been dismissed for resentencing, he likely will have to litigate whether the 
substantive claims can be revived. 
If Cox is required to pursue resentencing in habeas, it is not a simple task. He 
must take measures at this stage - unrelated to resentencing - to ensure that he has not 
waived any substantive claim that he may intend to raise at an appropriate time after an 
appeal in future habeas proceedings. The process at this juncture is cumbersome, time 
consuming and unpredictable.1 
Since a person seeking habeas relief typically has had his direct appeal, Rule 65C 
and the Act do not accommodate a simple procedure for resentencing. Those provisions 
1
 In Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264, this Court dismissed the defendant's appeal as untimely 
and directed him to proceed with habeas relief under Rule 65C and the Act. Id. That was 
in 1997. To date, no direct appeal has been processed for Jiminez. In Putnik, 2002 UT 
122, and Bowers, 2002 UT 100, this Court simply dismissed the appeals. No direct 
appeal has been processed for those defendants. 
In Clark, Case No. 20010819-SC; Munford, Case No. 20010413-SC; and Hassan, 
Case No. 20020885-SC, this Court ordered remand for resentencing. The defendants in 
those cases have since had an appeal on the merits as contemplated by this Court in 
Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38, and Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 704 (stating that the right to appeal must 
be carefully protected). See State v. Hassan, 2004 UT 99, 108 P.3d 695; State v. Clark, 
2004 UT 25, 89 P.3d 162; State v. Munford, 2003 UT App 279, 2003 UT App. LEXIS 
255 (attached hereto as an Addendum). 
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offer substantive relief; they allow ih* ivtiiioner'dcfend.-m u* present cxtra-rei.-nJ KK * , 
and they contemplate that the parties will fully litigate the substanti ve claims on the 
65C(j), (1). The provisions do not provide a plain, speedy, or adequate remedy for 
resentencing in a case where the record already supports ineffective assistance of counsel 
I recting ^ e a p p e a | 
That is not - < mat Rule 65C and the Act may never be used for resei itencing. 
The state asserts that i- -'"; ;n»t stipulate to resentencing "when a defendant consciously 
foregoes iJi* nt:lit to appeal i<; i ^ a u i j . : ^*.ii_> *n . . .^n: *IML ms counsel not to file the 
r - * G - > I - .- . d 
here supports ineffective assistance of counsel. (Brief of Petitioner, Argumc.it j>.) 
In this case, the only way to ensure that the constitutional right to appeal is pro 
t e d n l is lo remand lor rcsenlniciiij,1, lo the oiiyiiiall ln;il ntiiil • and i;\ ill 
there is no gap in Cox's right to the assistance of counsel in connection with his appeal. 
If the right to appeal has any meaning in a case ofthls nature, and if ihh T o u r J * 
perfecting the appeal should be permitted remand to that poii it in the j )i oceedii igs where 
the error occurred. In this case, error occurred when counsel 'filed an untimely post-trial 
motion and iaiieu io protect Cox in his right to appeal It occurred before sentencing. 
C o\ respectful 1", in|iiesls thai tlir I 'OIIII i n n i m ! this i .IM Im irsrtnein tnj» 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Petitioner and herein, Cox respectfully 
reques t tli.tl llir> ( IMIII ivniiiini litis c.is< Ini lesenhiu \i\y. 
SUBMITTED this 13**- day of ^ ^ A , , 2005 . 
7W& 
Linda M. Jones 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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PERCliklAM: 
verdict, \\ re view the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
: Suite v Dunn, S50 P 2<; 120 ?u> 
• ' * "Appellant be,.- * :* a-- \ 
oilmen * >• establishing Miat the e-. uiuu r JS M^  
inconclusive or insubstantial lh; i reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that [he] committed the crime.m Julian 
Sum 2002 UT hi. r ;o, x P 3d 1168 
, plaiting State v Kcrekes. 62? P 2d Ifrl 
1168 (i ,.. - . ..i. . * WA 
abstitute its judgment for v , •* IIK fact 
finder.'" Id. (quoting State v. Lamm, 606P 2d 
229, 231 (Utah 1980)), Further, this court 
"will not weigh conflicting evidence or tl le 
credibility [*2J of witnesses.'" Id. (quoting 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d8i L .v J-~14 (Utah 
1977)). Accordingly, we must assume the 
ji iry believed the testimoi.) c: the Statefs 
witnesses. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 12! - . 
..iw,:i. ... i mwoii *- -c^n!e^d :- *his 
instance 'veau.se he concedes that the issue1 
of the su!licicne\ nf the evidence was not 
nre-vrwJ in th, ' ' .' .. r *vr^, , iv> 
2003 UT App 279; 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 255, * 
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must demonstrate plain error. See State v. 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74, P 13, 10 P.3d 346. 
The requirements for plain error are that (1) 
error exists, (2) the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court, and (3) the error is 
harmful. See id. 
Munford argues on appeal that the State 
proved only his presence at the homicide, not 
participation. We disagree. The evidence, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict, demonstrates acts on Munford's part 
that could be construed as knowledge and 
participation, particularly in light of Kiriluk's 
roommate's testimony that Munford was 
present on at least one occasion where 
Kiriluk indicated he was going to kill Brown. 
The cumulative evidence was certainly not so 
insubstantial that reasonable minds must have 
entertained [*3] doubt. 
Munford also argues that his trial counsel 
was ineffective in failing to move for a 
directed verdict. However, because we 
determine that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury verdict, it stands to reason 
that a motion for a directed verdict would 
have been unsuccessful and futile. "The 
decision to forgo futile acts does not amount 
to ineffective assistance/' State v. Wallace, 
2002 UTApp 295, P 27, 55 P.3d 1147. 
The conviction is affirmed. 
Norman H. Jackson, Presiding Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
